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Abstract This paper presents an attempt to adapt in the context of deontic reasoning
a logic dened by Boutilier for reasoning with conditional preferences The rst motivation
for this work is that deontic logic can be given a semantics in terms of ordered worlds
like in this kind of logic the preference relation among worlds aims at ordering worlds
from the most ideal ones to the least ideal ones The second motivation is that Boutilier
introduced a model of an agents ability by distinguishing between controllable inuenceable
and uninuenceable propositions And we noticed that this partition can be related to
the notions introduced by Carmo and Jones for reasoning with ContraryToDuties This
present work shows an extension of Boutiliers work in order to use his logic for reasoning
with ContraryToDuties An exhaustive study of a benchmark example of CTDs leads us
to show that the results obtained with this extension coincide exactly with those obtained
by Carmo and Jones
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 Introduction
Deontic logic can be given a semantics in terms of ordered worlds the preference relation ordering
worlds from the most ideal ones to the least ideal ones Hansson in  was among the rst to
note this Prakken and Sergot presented in  an approach to adapting a semantics of ordered
worlds for reasoning correctly with norms with Contrary	To	Duty 
CTD More recently van
der Torre and Tan  dened a preference	based deontic logic based on Hanssons semantics
to correctly reason with Contrary	To	Duties and moral dilemmas
The main justication is that from a semantical point of view one can consider that the
obligations expressed by some norms induce a preference order between worlds For instance
even in the simplest case of a deontic logic like SDL one distinguishes in the semantics between
the ideal worlds 
those in which the obligatory propositions are true and the others the ideal
worlds being more preferred than the others Here there are only two levels of worlds In the
more complex case of norms with CTDs one needs to reason with primary obligations and
secondary obligations 
which arise when the rst ones are violated or more in case of multi	
level CTDs In such a case one can see this as inducing an ordering between worlds which
distinguishes the ideal worlds the sub	ideals worlds  and so on
In order to illustrate this point of view let us consider the classical dog scenario

a There ought to be no dog

b If there is no dog there ought not to be a warning sign

c If there is a dog there ought to be a warning sign
If we consider a language with two propositional variables dog and sign then the possible
worlds are 
w
 
 fdog signg w

 fdogsigng w

 fdog signg w

 fdogsigng
One meaning
 
 in terms of possible worlds that we can give to the three previous sentences
is the following
Let  be a preference relation
 Sentence 
a can be interpreted as follows any world in which there is no dog is more
preferred than any world in which there is a dog
Thus w

 w
 
and w

 w

but also w

 w
 
and w

 w


 Sentence 
b can be interpreted as follow the world in which there is no dog and no sign
is preferred to the world in which there is no dog but a sign ie w

 w


Which leads with the previous data to  w

 w

 w
 
and w

 w

 w


 Finally sentence 
c can be interpreted as follows the world in which there is a dog and
a sign is preferred to the world in which there is a dog but no sign ie w
 
 w


Which leads with the previous data to  w

 w

 w
 
 w


Thus nally these sentences oer us the only one possibility of ordering worlds 
w

 w

 w
 
 w

 
In section  we will discuss the classical problem of natural language sentence modelisation and the diculties
raised by natural language ambiguities
Following these ideas we have found that the work described in  was quite interesting
There Boutilier describes a logic of goals called CO whose semantics is dened in terms of
worlds ordered by a total pre	order ranking worlds from the most preferred ones to the least
preferred ones
And precisely the previous model is a CO model of some sentences expressing 
a 
b and

c in terms of preferential goals
One can notice that Boutilier himself mentions that CO logic is based on Hanssons deontic
logic and that a conditional goal can be given the interpretation of a conditional obligation
Furthermore in his work Boutilier tries to characterize an adequate notion of ideal goals
and shows the importance of taking into account a model of the agents ability In doing so
Boutilier introduces the notions of controllable infuenceable and uninuencable propositions
These notions are then used to dene ideal goals Intuitively speaking the impact of this model
on the denition of ideal goal is twofold for characterizing ideal goals one must reason with the
propositions which are not inuenceable 
ie those whose truth value the agent cannot change
and furthermore a goal must be a proposition which is controllable by the agent 
ie one whose
truth value the agent can change
It seemed interesting to us to relate this model of agent ability to the one introduced by
Carmo and Jones  who aimed to show its impact on a correct reasoning with CTDs This
relation constitutes the core of our work
The present paper is organized as follows In section  Boutiliers logic is presented We
focus on its semantics We also focus on the model of an agents ability and its impact on the
denitions of ideal goals In section  we recall the problem of Contrary	To	Duties 
CTD raised
in deontic reasoning We focus on the postulates introduced by Carmo and Jones who express
a set of properties a deontic logic should satisfy in order to reason correctly with CTD Carmo
and Jones show the impact of a model of the agents ability on the denitions of two kinds
of obligations in reasoning with CTD Section  shows how we suggest extending Boutiliers
work in order to fulll Carmo and Joness postulates about a logic for reasoning with norms
with CTD One classical example of reasoning with Contrary	to	Duties is examined in section
 Finally section  is devoted to a discussion
 Boutiliers logic of goals
In this section we present the logic CO developed by Craig Boutilier to reason with qualita	
tive statements of preference We only recall its semantics the axiomatic presentation being
described in  Then we focus on a restriction of CO named CO
 

  Semantics of CO
Boutilier assumes a propositional bimodal language over a nite set of atomic propositional
variables with the usual connectives and two modal operators denoted   and

 
 The semantics
of CO is based on models of the form M  hW i where W is a set of possible worlds  is
a valuation function which associates any propositional letter to a set of worlds in which it is
true and  is a total preorder

on worlds v  w means that v is a world at least as preferred
as w
Let M  W   be a model The valuation of a formula in M is given by the following
denition
Denition   M j  i for all w in W  M j
w
 for any formula 
 M j
w
a i w  
a for any propositional letter a
 M j
w
 i M j
w
 for any formula 
 M j
w


 
 

 i M j
w

 
and M j
w


 if 
 
and 

are formulas
 M j
w
  i for all v such that v  w M j
v

 M j
w

 
 i for all v such that w  v M j
v

Thus   is true in a world w i  is true in all the worlds at least as preferred as w And

 
 is true in a world w i  is true in all worlds less preferred than w As usual the dual
operators  and


are dened by  
def
  and


 
def


 

Boutilier also denes

 
 
def
 

 
 and


 
def
	



Example Let us consider a model M consisting in four worlds w
 
 w

 w

 w

ordered as
follows

w
 
w

w

w

a
b
c

a
b
c

a
b
c

a
b
c
Then M j

 
a since every world satises a Furthermore M j
w
 b since any world at
least as preferred as w

satises b
Denition  As usual we say that M satises a formula  i M j 
Denition  Let E be a set of formulas and  a formula of CO We say that  is derived

or deduced from E i any model M which satises E also satises  We note it E j 

This means that   is a re	exive transitive and connected 
ie total binary relation over W

We adopt the usual following notation the letter P appears as positive in the world w i w  
P  and
appears as negative if w  
P 
   Semantics of CO
 
As Boutilier noted it in  when ranking states of aairs we want often to take all logically
possible worlds into consideration For this reason he considered a class of CO	models in which
each propositional truth valuation is witnessed by some possible world
This leads to the denition of logic CO
 
which is the smallest extension of CO closed under
all rules of CO and containing the following axiom



 for all satisable proposition 
In the rest of the paper we will focus on CO
 
instead of CO
  Conditional preferences
In order to express conditional preferences Boutilier denes a conditional connective I

j
 by
the following denition
Denition 
I
j 
def

 
	



  
 
In a rst approximation we can interpret I
j by if  then the agent should ensure 
Let us recall some more denitions that will be useful in the following
Denition  An absolute preference  is dened as I
j 
or equivalently


  and
abbreviated I

In semantical terms this means that the most preferred worlds are  worlds
Denition 	 The relative preference between two propositions is dened by
 
P
 
def

 

  
 
P
 means that  is at least as preferred as  
ie the best 	worlds are at least as good
as the best 	worlds
In order to determine hisher actual goals an agent must have knowledge about the real
world Boutilier then considers KB a consistent nite set of formulas written without any
modality in order to represent the knowledge the agent has about the real world KB is called
a knowledge base Considering KB and a CO
 
	model the ideal situations are characterized by
the most preferred worlds which satisfy all the agents knowledge This is formally dened by
the following denitions
Denition 
 Let L
CPL
be the propositional sublanguage of CO
 
 Let KB be a knowledge
base Cl
KB is dened by
Cl
KB  f  L
CPL
such that j KB   and  is a literalg

Denition  Let E be a set of conditional preferences Let KB be a knowledge base An
ideal goal derived from E is a formula  of L
CPL
such that E j I
jCl
KB
Example Let L be a language with propositional variables r 
the agent crosses the main
road and b 
the agent bikes Consider the two conditionals I
r and I
rjb which express
that generally the agent prefers to cross the main road 
to go to the university for instance
but if he bikes he prefers not to cross the main road
The possible worlds are w
 
 frbg w

 fr bg w

 fr bg and w

 frbg
Because of I
r w
 
and w

can be the most preferred worlds But due to I
rjb w

cannot
be the most preferred world So w
 
is the most preferred world This leads to w
 
 w

 w
 
 w

and w
 
 w

 Besides that we cannot have w

 w

because of I
rjb so we have w

 w


Thus I
r and I
rjb are only satised in the following CO
 

models
M
 
 w
 
 w

 w

 w

M

 w
 
 w

 w

 w

M

 w
 
 w

 w

 w

Suppose that KB
 
 fbg 
ie the agent does not bike Then Cl
KB
 
  fbg So the
ideal goals are the formulas  such that I
jb is satised in all the previous models ie the
ideal goal is here r This means that since heshe does not bike the agent prefers to cross the
main road
Suppose now that KB

 fbg 
ie the agent bikes Then we can now deduce that r is an
ideal goal This means that since heshe bikes the agent prefers not to cross the main road
  Controllable inuenceable and uninuenceable propositions
By the previous denition of ideal goals every formula  which satises E j I
jCl
KB is a
goal But as Boutilier notes this denition is fair only if KB is xed If the agent can change
the truth of some elements in KB ideal goals as previously dened may be too restrictive For
instance KB

expresses that the agent is biking Assume that he may change his mind and not
to use his bike 
this is a quite reasonable assumption here In this case he may prefer not use
his bike in order to fulll the most preferred goal ie crossing the main road
So for computing the closure of the knowledge base Cl
KB Boutilier suggests considering
only the formulas whose truth cannot be changed by the agents actions

In fact Boutilier denes Cl
KB in a more general way  he uses a non monotonic logic to deduce the default
knowledge of the agent Here in order to simplify the presentation we choose to reduce his point of view to
classical logic
Furthermore as Boutilier notes an agents actions must play a role in factoring out un	
achievable goals For instance an agent might prefer that it does not rain but this is something
over which he has no control Though it is an ideal outcome calling this a goal is unreasonable
To capture such distinctions Boutilier introduces a simple model of action and ability to
demonstrate its inuence on conditional goals He suggests partitioning the atomic propositions
in two classes  P  C  C in which C is the set of atomic propositions that the agent can
control 
ie the agent can change the truth value of those propositions and C is the set of
atomic propositions that the agent cannot control
For instance the atomic proposition representing the fact the agent bikes can be considered as
controllable The atomic proposition representing the fact it rains can reasonably be considered
as uncontrollable
Then Boutilier generalises this notion as follows
Denition  For any set of atomic variables P  let V 
P  be the set of truth assignments to
this set If v  V 
P  and w  V 
Q for disjoint sets P and Q then vw  V 
P  Q denotes
the obvious extended assignment The neutral element of  is V 
 which is the empty truth
assignment
Denition  Given C and C a proposition  is controllable i for every u  V 
C there
is some v  V 
C and w  V 
C such that v u j  and w u j 
A proposition  is said uncontrollable i it is not controllable
A proposition  is inuenceable i for some u  V 
C there is some v  V 
C and w  V 
C
such that v u j  and w u j 
A proposition  is uninuenceable i it is not inuenceable
For instance if a  C and b  C then a  b is inuenceable but not controllable Indeed
a b is not controllable because b is not controllable and if b is false the agent cannot make a b
be true But it is inuencable because if b is true then the agent can inuence the truth value
of a  b by assigning a to true or false
Denition  The uninuenceable belief set of an agent is dened by
UI
KB  f  Cl
KB such that  is uninuenceableg
In a rst part of his work

 Boutilier considers that UI
KB is a complete set ie the truth
value of all uncontrollable 
not controllable atoms is known which is expressed by
 uncontrollable   UI
KB or   UI
KB
Under this hypothesis Boutilier renes the notion of goals and introduces the notion of
CKgoal as follows

In a second part of his work Boutilier also examines the case when UI
KB is not complete but we will not
consider it in detail here
Denition  Let E be a set of conditional preferences and KB a knowledge base such that
UI
KB is complete Then a proposition  is a CK	goal derived from E i  is controllable
and E j I
jUI
KB
Example continued Let us again consider E  fI
r I
rjbg Assume here that the
agent does not bike because his bike has been stolen
First assume that crossing the road is still in the agents ability Thus b is uncontrollable
but r is not So by denition  r is a CK	goal derived from E the agent will have to cross
the main road
Now assume that there are works on the main road and it is impossible for anybody to cross
it This is expressed by considering that r is now uncontrollable Here according to denition
 r 
crossing the road is not a CK	goal derived from E due to the fact that the agent cannot
cross the main road 
and this is beyond his control
 ContrarytoDuties
Formalisation of Contrary	to	Duties 
CTD is a central point in the study in deontic logic In
this section we mainly sum up Carmo and Joness work 
 Postulates dened by Carmo and Jones
A CTD can be modelled by a primary norm and a secondary norm which takes eect when the
rst norm is violated One famous CTD example is the Chisholms paradox 

a X ought to go to help your neighbours

b It ought to be that if X goes he tells them he is coming

c If X does not go he ought not to tell them he is coming

d X does not go
If X does not go to help his neighbours he ought not to tell them he is coming In this case
he violated the rst norm which compelled him to help his neighbours
The rst attempt to model CTD was by using SDL logic as follows

a O
help

b O
telljhelp

c O
telljhelp

d help
where the conditional O
AjB can be represented by one of the two following ways

 O
BjA 
def
A OB

 O
BjA 
def
O
A B
Unfortunately the two previous ways of modelling CTD lead to inconsistencies or depen	
dencies between the four sentences which are properties unanimously rejected
Some attempts have been done to use a temporal deontic logic to solve the Chisholm paradox
But like Prakken and Sergot in  Carmo and Jones reject this formalisation because not all
examples of CTD are temporal ones
Besides this some tried to use nonmonotonic logics to solve CTDs problems But this
approach has been criticized by many people insisting on the fact that the rule 
c is not an
exception to the rule 
a 
which is a typical application of nonmonotonic logic but is a case of
violation of a prima facie obligation
Another problem which has been discussed concerns the representation of 
b and 
c Ac	
cording to Prakken and Sergot  
b and 
c must have dierent representations since 
c
unlike 
b is a contrary	to	duty conditional expressing what should hold in case of violation of

a Carmo and Jones reject this point of view because it makes the representation dependent
on updates if one wants to introduce new CTDs or remove norms one has to modify the norms
already expressed
This leads Carmo and Jones to express a rst set of postulates that must be respected by a
logic for correctly reasoning with CTDs 

i the set of formulas 
a 
b 
c and 
d must be consistent

ii the formulas 
a 
b 
c and 
d must be logically independent ie
none of them is a logical consequence of some others

iii the logic must apply to timeless and actionless CTD	examples

iv sentences 
b and 
c must have a similar structure
Furthermore as Carmo and Jones point out the CTD examples show the existence of two
kinds of obligations they call ideal and actual For instance in the Chisholm set we need to be
able to deduce that under ideal circumstances the ideal obligation of the agent is to help his
neighbours and to tell them he is coming but under the certain circumstance 
ie the violation
of 
a the actual obligation of the agent is not to tell his neighbours he is coming So Carmo
and Jones add three postulates 

v capacity to derive actual obligations

vi capacity to derive ideal obligations

vii capacity to represent the fact that a violation has occured
Finally Carmo and Jones address the pragmatic oddity problem  raised by some formal	
isations of CTD in particular in SDL This problem comes from the fact that some formalisations
of CTD structures assume only one kind of obligation and then do not allow the derivation of
dierent levels of obligations For instance in the Chisholm example the pragmatic oddity
problem can be illustrated by the following reasoning the agent must help his neighbours

this is said by the rst rule Furthermore since he does not help his neighbours he must not
tell them he is coming So the agent must help his neighbours and must not tell them he is
coming Which is a bit strange So Carmo and Jones add a last postulate which an adequate
representation of CTDs should satisfy

viii capacity to avoid pragmatic oddity
  Carmo and Jones	s logic
In  Carmo and Jones dene a logic to reason with CTDs and which satises the previous
postulates This logic is based on a dyadic conditional deontic operator O which allows one
to express norms and two monadic deontic operators O
i
and O
a
to express respectively ideal
obligation and actual obligation
The main question is  what are the contexts that allow one to derive the two kinds of
obligation ie actual and ideal obligation  To answer that question Jones and Carmo use two
kinds of necessity operators called here agent	dependent	necessity and agent	independent	
necessity and respectively denoted here

 
a
and  
i

 The agentdependentnecessity
The operator of agent	dependent	necessity is denoted here  
a
and its dual connective 
a

Intuitively  
a
 expresses that the proposition  is xed in a certain situation given what
the agent decides to do or not to do
In the Chisholm scenario the fact that the agent does not go to help his neighbours and
decides not to go can be formulated by  
a
help On the other hand 
a
help expresses
the fact that the agent did not decide not to go to help his neighbours
This operator is used to derive actual obligations through the following axiom
O
j  
a
 
a
 
a
  O
a

In the context of the Chisholm scenario an instance of this axiom is the following knowing
that if the agent does not go to help his neighbours then he must not tell them he is coming
the agent decided not to help them the agent did not decide to tell them he is coming nor
not to tell them he is coming then we can infer that the agent has the actual obligation
not to tell his neighbours he is coming Furthermore this axiom does not allow one to
derive the actual obligation not to tell his neighbours he is coming if the agent can change
his mind and by one of his actions help his neighbours

We change the notations because Carmo and Jones use some symbols that Boutilier already uses in his work
for dierent purposes
 The agentindependent necessity
The operator of agent	independent	necessity is denoted  
i
here and its dual connective

i
 Intuitively  
i
 expresses that the proposition  is not xed by the agents decisions
but is xed whatever the agent could decide
For instance in the Chisholm example if the agent cannot move 
he is ill for example
then it is impossible for him to help its neighbours independently of his will
The agent	independent	necessity is used to derive ideal obligations as shown by the fol	
lowing axiom
O
j  
i
 
i
 
i
  O
i

For instance knowing that if the agent does not help his neighbours then he must not tell
them he is coming if the agent cannot help them 
because he is ill and if he can tell them
or not tell them 
the telephone works then he ideally must not tell them he is coming
One must notice that the agent	independent	necessity and the agent	dependent	necesssity
are two dierent notions Indeed the fact that the agent decides not to help his neigbours

 
a
help is dierent from the fact that the agent cannot help them 
 
i
help Notice however
that   
i
  
a
 ie if it is necessary that  beyond the agents will then  is xed whatever
the agent could decide
Carmo and Jones dene a semantics and an axiomatics of a logic for deriving actual obliga	
tions ideal obligations 
see  for more details Furthermore they dene the notion of violation
by
viol
A 
def
O
i
A  A
That is A is violated if A is ideally obligatory but A is not true
 Adaptation of Boutiliers formalism to represent CTDs
Here we show an adaptation of Boutiliers work which fullls the previous postulates if as we
will see we accept to reformulate them This adaptation follows Carmo and Joness ideas
 Modelling CTDs in CO
 
We present the way of modelling CTDs in CO
 
on a particular example which is the dog scenario

a There ought to be no dog

b If there is no dog there ought to be no sign

c If there is a dog there ought to be a sign

d There is a dog
In the introduction we have described one meaning that can be given to the rst three
sentences This meaning led to one possibility of ordering worlds It happens that this order
between possible worlds is the only CO
 
	model of the four following CO
 
formulas

a I
dog

b I
signjdog

c I
signjdog

e 
dog  sign 
P

dog  sign
Then this is the way we suggest to model the rst three sentences
And we suggest to represent the fact that there is a dog 
sentence 
d by

d dog  KB
Notice that here the rst three sentences are modelled by four formulas Thus litterally
we cannot check if this modelisation respect Carmo and Joness rst two postulates However
it respects them if we accept to sligtly reformulate them as follows

i The set of formulas which model the CTD must be consistent

ii The formulas which model the CTD must be logically independent
One can check thant the CO
 
formulas 
a 
b 
c and 
e are consistent and none of them
is a logical consequence of some others However there is in some sense a dependance between
these formulas Some comments about this will be made in section 
Furthermore this modelisation respects postulates 
iii and 
iv
  Back to the controllability and inuenceability of propositions
As already mentioned Boutilier partitions the propositions in three classes  controllable inu
enceable and uninuenceable Our goal in this section is to nd a relation between Boutiliers
notions of controllability and inuenceability and Carmo and Joness notions of necessity
Assumption First of all let us insist on the fact that comparison is done under the as	
sumption that the knowledge on the real world is complete That is to say if KB denotes the
description of the real world for every atomic proposition a we have  KB  a or  KB  a
Let us rst notice that if a proposition  is controllable 
resp inuenceable uninuenceable
then  is controllable 
resp inuenceable uninuenceable too The proof is immediate
In the following we examine the dierent cases that can arise for a given propositional
formula 
  is a uninuenceable propositional formula 
in the sense of Boutilier

a Suppose that  KB   
to simplify we say that  is true in the real world or
simply true then whatever the agent can do  will be true This means that  is
agent	independent	necessarily true to use the terminology we introduce in section
 So 
Proposition  f   KB   and  uninuenceableg 
def
f    
i


g

b Suppose now that  KB   Then because KB is complete we have  KB  
 is uninuenceable so  is uninuenceable too Whatever the agent will do  will
be false
Proposition  f   KB   and  is uninuenceableg 
def
f    
i
g
  is inuenceable
 may be controllable or not

a  is controllable
i Suppose that  KB  
Since  is controllable the agent can decide to maintain  true or can decide
to change it to false For representing this we introduce two new notions in
addition to Boutiliers
A We say that  true in the actual situation is controllableandxed if the
agent decides to keep  true
For instance if  represents the fact the agent does not help his neighbours
and if the actual situation is such that the agent does not help his neighbours
and decides not to help them then we consider that   KB and  is
controllable	and	xed
Proposition  f   KB   and  controllable	and	xedg 
def
f      
a
g
B We say that  true in the actual situation is controllableandunxed if the
agent can decide to change the truth of 
For instance if  represents the fact the agent does not help his neighbours
and if the actual situation is such that the agent does not help his neighbours
but accepts the idea that he can help them then we consider that   KB
and  is controllable	and	unxed

Note that we could also write 
  
i
 but this is equivalent because the connective  
i
is KTtype
Proposition  f   KB   and  is controllable	and	unxedg 
def
f    
a
g
ii In the case where  cannot be deduced from KB we have  KB   
because
KB is complete
 is controllable so is  We can introduce the same previous two cases 
A and

B depending on the fact that  
or equivalently  is controllable	and	xed
or controllable	and	unxed

b If  is not controllable 
but inuenceable
i Assume  KB  
 is true in the actual situation Since  is inuenceable there are two cases
the agent can or cannot change the truth of 
Let us illustrate this by the following example Assume that p is a controllable
variable and q an uncontrollable variable Assume that KB  fpqg The
formula p  q is false in KB and will remain false whatever the value the agent
will give to p We will say that p  q is uninuenceable in KB In contrast the
formula p	 q is true in KB but the agent can change its truth value by changing
p to false or can keep it to true
The details are as follows
A If the actual situation is such that the agent cannot change the truth of 
then  will be true whatever the agent can do It is the same case as  is
true and uninuenceable In this case we say that  is uninuenceable in
KB
B If the actual situation is such that the agent can change the truth of  there
are two cases  the agent can keep  true 
case aiA and  is controllable	
and	xed or can change its truth 
case aiB and  is controllable	and	
unxed
ii Finally assume  KB  
Then because KB is complete we have  KB   so  is false in the ac	
tual situation We can do the same study as before and deduce that  can be
uninuenceable in KB controllable	and	xed or controllable	and	unxed
Summary
After this comparison we nd the following relations
 the true and uninuenceable propositions and the true and uninuenceable in KB propo	
sitions both correspond to the agent	independent	necessarily true propositions
 true and controllableandxed propositions correspond to the true and agent	dependent	
necessarily true propositions
 the notion of true and controllableandunxed propositions correspond to the true and
agent	dependent	possibly false propositions
 Denitions
Let us extend Boutiliers denitions taking into account the new model of agent ability dened
above We dene ideal obligations violations and actual obligations as follows
Denition  UI
 

KB is the set of propositions that are true and uninuenceable or unin	
uenceable in KB UI


KB is the set of propositions that are true and controllable	and	xed
or true and uninuenceable or uninuenceable in KB
Ideal obligations are dened by
Denition  Let E be a set of conditionals The ideal obligations deduced from E are
dened by the following set 
O
i

def
fO
i
  E j I
jUI
 

KB and  is controllableg

Actual obligations are dened by
Denition  Let E be a set of conditionals The actual obligations deduced from E are
dened by the set 
O
a

def
fO
a
  E j I
jUI


KB and  is controllable	and	unxedg
Violations are dened by
Denition 
viol  
def
O
i
 and 
 KB  
 Semantical point of view
We can reformulate the previous denitions in terms of CO
 
s ordered models as follows
Denition  Let E be a set of preferential conditionals andM
 
M
n
all its possible models
	

Let KB be the current situation
Let U denote the set of propositions which are true in KB and uninuenceable or uninu	
enceable in KB
Let CF denote the set of propositions which are true in KB and controllable	and	xed
For i  fng M
 
i
is dened as the restriction of M
i
to U 	worlds
 


For i  fng M

i
is dened as the restriction of model M
i
to U  CF 	worlds
  


Recall the denition E j  i any model M which satises E also satises 
	
Remember that each model is a set of ordered worlds
 

M
 
i
is obtained by considering M
i
and deleting any world which does not satisfy U
  
M

i
is obtained by considering M
i
and deleting any world which does not satisfy U CF
Ideal obligations are dened by
Denition 	 O
i

def
fO
i
  i  nM
 
i
j I
 and  is controllableg
In other words  is ideally obligatory if  is controllable 
ie the agent can control its truth
value and  is satised in each preferred world of eachM
 
i
 ie in each preferred world of models
of the norms restricted to worlds which satisfy the propositions true in KB and uninuenceable
or uninuenceable in KB
Actual obligations are dened by
Denition 
 O
a

def
fO
a
  i  nM

i
j I
 and  is controllable	and	unxedg
In other words  is actually obligatory if  is controllable	and	unxed 
ie the agent did
not decide not to change its truth value and  is satised in each preferred world of each M

i
ie in each preferred world of the models of the norms restricted to worlds which satisfy the
propositions true in KB uninuenceable or uninuenceable in KB or controllable	and	xed
Violations are dened by
Denition 
viol  
def
O
i
 and 
 KB  
We can prove that the denitions given in section  are equivalent to the denitions given
here in terms of restricted models
These denitions will be illustrated in the next section in which we examine some interesting
cases that can happen in the dog scenario We will show that the last four postulates listed by
Carmo and Jones are satised
	 Study of an example
The rst three sentences of the dog scenario are modelled by the four CO
 
	formulas

aI
dog 
bI
signjdog 
cI
signjdog 
e
dog  sign 
P

dog  sign
As already mentionned the only CO
 
	model which satises these sentences is shown in
gure 
Let us examine some cases that can happen In each case we characterize what are the ideal
obligations violations and actual obligations
Figure  CO
 
	model of the dog scenario
M
 
dog
sign

dog
sign

dog
sign

dog
sign

 First case KB   fdog signg
 The variables dog and sign are uncontrollable
In this case the presence of the dog and the sign is imposed on the agent So since
no variable is controllable there is no ideal obligation thus no violation and no actual
obligation
 dog is uncontrollable and sign is controllable	and	xed
The presence of the dog is imposed The agent put a sign and decided not to remove it
If we restrict the previous model to dog	worlds we get only one restricted model sayM
 
 

in which the preferred world is fdog signg
If we restrict it to dog sign	models we get only one model say M

 
 with only one world
fdog signg
Thus the ideal obligation is O
i
sign
Since there is a sign in the current situation there is no violation
Finally since sign is controllable	and	xed there is no actual obligation
Intuitively this means that having the sign is ideally required and since we are in a
situation where there is the sign and the agent decided not to remove it there is no actual
obligation about that sign
 dog is uncontrollable and sign is controllable	and	unxed
The presence of the dog is still imposed The agent put a sign but here he has not decide
to keep that sign 
ie he can still change his mind and remove it
If we restrict the previous model to dog	worlds we get only one restricted model M
 
 

in which the preferred world is fdog signg Furthermore we get a restricted model M

 
which is identical to M
 
 

Thus again the ideal obligation is O
i
sign
Since there is a sign in the current situation there is no violation
But now the actual obligation is O
a
sign
This means that in M

 
 even if the world which corresponds to the current situation is
the most preferred one since the agent may decide to remove the sign the situation can
change to a less preferred world in which there is no sign So if we want the situation
to be the most preferred world we must require actually that the agent does not remove
the sign
 dog is controllable	and	xed and sign is uncontrollable
Here the presence of the sign is imposed on the agent who has got a dog and decided not
to get rid of it
The restricted model M
 
 
is fdog signg  fdog signg
The most preferred world is fdog signg so there is an ideal obligation which is O
i
dog
Because KB  fdog signg O
i
dog is violated  V ioldog
There is only one restricted model M

 
where the unique world is fdog signg But since
dog is controllable	and	xed there is no actual obligation
This means that the current situation does not correspond to the most preferred world so
the agent violates the ideal obligation of not having a dog Furthermore since the agent
has decided not to get rid of the dog there is no actual obligation
 dog is controllable	and	unxed and sign is uncontrollable
Again the presence of the sign is imposed on the agent who has got a dog but here he
may decide to get rid of it
Again there is only one ideal obligation O
i
dog which is violated
The dierence between this case and the former one is that because dog is controllable	
and	unxed we can derive O
a
dog
This means that as the agent has not decided to keep his dog he has now the actual
obligation to get rid of it
In terms of ordered worlds this can be reformulated as follows given what is indepen	
dent of the agent or xed by the agent 
here there is a sign the most ideal world is
fdog signg So the current situation is not the most ideal world But here the agent
by one of his action 
getting rid of his dog can reach this world he has the actual
obligation to do so
 dog and sign are controllable	and	xed
We can deduce that O
i
dog and O
i
sign
 

Both are violated 
since the agent has a dog and put a sign and decided not to remove
them but there is no actual obligation
 dog is controllable	and	xed and sign is controllable	and	unxed
We can deduce that O
i
dog and O
i
sign
 
Notice that in Carmo and Jones logic we can only derive the ideal obligation of dog  sign which does
not imply O
i

dog and O
i

sign
Both O
i
dog and O
i
sign are violated
Furthermore there is an actual obligation O
a
sign
In other words the agent violates the ideal obligation of not having a dog but since he
does have one and has decided not to get rid of it he does not have the actual obligation
to get rid of his dog Besides he violates the ideal obligation of not having a sign but
since he has not decided to keep his sign or to remove it he has the actual obligation not
to remove it
 dog is controllable	and	unxed and sign is controllable	and	xed
We can still deduce that O
i
dog and O
i
sign and that both ideal obligations are violated
Furthermore here we can derive an actual obligation  O
a
dog The agent has to get rid
of his dog
In terms of ordered worlds this can be explained as it has been done in case 
 dog and sign are controllable	and	unxed
We still have O
i
dog and O
i
sign
Both ideal obligations are violated
The actual obligations are O
a
dog and O
a
sign
That means that since there must be no dog and no sign ideally even if there were a dog
and a sign since the agent can remove both of them he has the actual obligation to do
so

  Second case KB   fdogsigng
 dog is uncontrollable and sign is controllable	and	unxed
The presence of a dog is imposed on the agent who did not put a sign but can change his
mind and put one
Restricting the model to dog	worlds leads to a model in which the world fdog signg is
preferred to the world fdogsigng
So the ideal obligation is O
i
sign
Here this obligation is violated since there is no sign in the current situation To move to
the most preferred world from the actual one the agent has to put a sign
As the agent can decide to put a sign or not the actual obligation is O
a
sign Ie the agent
is required actually to do so
 dog is controllable	and	xed and sign is uncontrollable
The absence of a sign is imposed on the agent for instance there is no possibility for the
agent to put such a warning sign because the service which delivers them stopped their
production
The agent has got a dog and decided not to get rid of it
Restricting the model to sign	worlds leads to a model in which the world fdogsigng
is preferred to the world fdogsigng
So the ideal obligation is O
i
dog And this is violated since the current situation is not
the preferred one
There is no actual obligation
 dog is controllable	and	unxed and sign is uncontrollable
Again the absence of a sign is imposed on the agent But here the agent has got a dog
but may decide to get rid of it
The restricted model M
 
 
here is the same as before So the ideal obligation is still O
i
dog
This ideal obligation is violated since the current world is fdogsigng
The restricted model M

 
is identical to M
 
 
 So the actual obligation is O
a
dog  the
agent must actually get rid of the dog

 Third case KB   fdog signg
 dog and sign are uncontrollable
As before there is no ideal obligation no violation and no actual obligation since every	
thing is outside the agents power
 dog is uncontrollable and sign is controllable	and	xed
The restricted model M
 
 
is such that the world fdogsigng is preferred to the world
fdog signg So the ideal obligation is O
i
sign
This is violated since the current situation 
there is no dog but a sign is not the most
preferred one
There is no actual obligation
 dog and sign are controllable	and	unxed
The ideal obligations are still O
i
dog and O
i
sign Both of them are violated
The actual obligations are O
a
dog and O
a
sign 
ie the agent must actually not buy a
dog and remove the sign

 Fourth case KB   fdogsigng
 dog is controllable	and	xed and sign is controllable	and	unxed
The ideal obligations are O
i
dog and O
i
sign
None of them is violated
The actual obligation is O
a
sign 
ie the agent is actually required not to put a sign
 dog is controllable	and	unxed and sign is controllable	and	xed
The ideal obligations are O
i
dog and O
i
sign
None of them is violated
The actual obligation is O
a
dog 
ie the agent is required not to buy a dog in order to
respect the primary obligation
 dog and sign are controllable	and	unxed
The ideal obligations are O
i
dog and O
i
sign
None of them is violated
The actual obligations are O
a
dog and O
a
sign 
the current situation fullls the ideal
obligations since there is no dog and no sign and the agent is actually required not to
buy a dog nor to put a sign

 Discussion
We have modelled the dog scenario with Carmo and Joness logic and we have compared all the
dierent cases In most cases the two representations lead to the same results This tends to
prove that the present model is interesting
However some assumptions such as the completeness of the description of the current world
should be examined
One can notice that the modelisation we give here is the not the one presented at DEON
 but is the one which was discussed at the end of this paper
Indeed in the initial version of the paper the interpretation in term of ordered models we
made of the CTD was dierent Consequently the CTD was modelled only by the three formulas

a 
b and 
c With this rst modelisation in some cases of the dog scenario the results we
get were dierent from the ones Carmo and Jones get We noticed that the interpretation
Carmo and Jones make was using the assumption saying that among the two sign	worlds the
one in which there is no dog is preferred to the one in which there is a dog which is due to rst
sentence Carmo and Jones convinced us that this assumption was not implicit but was due to
the fact that the sentence There ought to be no dog should be interpreted by any world in which
there is no dog is preferred to any world in which there is a dog This is why we changed the
modelisation and add a fourth sentence as suggested at the end of 
This hesitation illustrates the well	known problem of formalizing natural language sentences
Our negative results were not due to the formalism we used but due to the way we used it to
model sentences Natural language is ambiguous And the only way to raise the ambiguities is
to nd the models of the sentences Here we claim that these models are expressed by orders
on possible worlds So depending on the models one wants one get one formula or another ie
one modelisation or another However we insist on the fact that what is the most important for
understanding a set of natural language sentences is to determine its underlying models Here
the interpretation we give to the dog scenario leads to only one model
What is subject to critics is the fact that from a syntactical point of view the three natural
language sentences are modelled by four formulas and more precisely the fact that the fourth
formula depends on the others We suspect that this fourth formula is due to the rst sentence of
course but also to the other ones and so in a sense constraints the context of the rst sentence
It is not yet entirely clear to us the kind of dependence that exists between the fourth formula
and the others The clarication of this important aspect needs further research
However even if far from perfect the approach of adapting a logic of conditional preferences
for reasoning with CTDs oers the advantage of reasoning correctly with norms with exceptions
This is not at all surprising since this kind of logic is designed for this purpose
Let us consider for instance the following sentence
There ought to be no fence except if the cottage is by the seaside
Due to the ambiguity of the natural language we think that this sentence can be given two
readings respectively modelled by the following set of CO
 
formulas
 I
fenceI
fencejseaside
Here the interpretation is generally there ought to be no fence but if the cottage is by
the seaside having a fence is permitted
 I
fence I
fencejseaside
Here the interpretation is generally there ought to be no fence but if the cottage is by
the seaside then there ought to a be a fence
Of course these two representations lead to two dierent sets of CO
 
	models and deductions
that can be made are dierent from one case to the other
As for the sentences of the kind There ought to be no dog unless there is a sign which we
think are not CTD norms nor norms with exceptions they also can be modelled in CO
 
 by
the following sentence  I
dog	sign By this representation we can conclude that the worlds
in which there is no dog 
with or without a sign or in which there is a dog but a sign are all
equally preferred and all preferred to the world in which there is a dog but no sign
Finally let us notice that the same kind of approach than ours has been recently followed
by van der Torre and Tan Indeed in  they introduce a preference	based logic 
PDL based
on Hanssons semantics Models are dened by a set of worlds a preference relation between
worlds not totally connected an equivalence relation between worlds 
used to charcacterize
some possible worlds describing all the possible states of aairs and a valuation function
Like Boutilier they dene a dyadic operator I
j and a betterness relation  The rst
operator corresponds to Boutiliers I operator but is dierently dened The second corresponds
to Boutiliers 
P
relation but again is dierently dened
Finally van der Torre and Tan dene the conditional obligation O
j by
O
j 
def
I
j  
    
  
Which means that the preferred  worlds are  worlds and no    world is as preferable
as an    world
With their denitions the modelisation of the dog scenario is O
dogjT  O
signjdog
O
signjdog dog This set of formulas has only one model in PDL which is the one described
in gure  Thus it is interesting to notice that despite dierent denitions van der Torre
and Tans approach and the one described in this present paper characterize the same model

in terms of ordered worlds of the dog scenario But a formal comparison between the two
approaches remains to be done And we must in the future examine what are the impacts
of their dierences However the comparison will not be so easy because they have no agents
ability model nor the distinction between ideal obligations and actual obligations
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